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Abstract—We study the problem of veriﬁcation of security
properties of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) using the model
analyser Alloy. We propose a novel approach to model analysis
and demonstrating robustness of protocol models in ﬁrst-order
logic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have become pervasive since evolving to-
wards the 3G and 4G architectures and strive to provide faster
and more reliable service, better integration of services and
enhanced protection of users against malicious attacks [12].
One of the key considerations is to integrate security in the
model design in order to incorporate better defences to protect
against malicious attacks [10], [17].
Current challenges of wireless networks include optimal
protocol design, protocol adaptation, consistent quality and
reliability of service [2], [15], [7].
In this paper we investigate a logic-based approach to
modelling of a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). We model
the protocols in ﬁrst-order logic and use the model analyser
Alloy [14] to specify properties of the message exchange using
SIP.
We study the ﬁrst-order logic model of SIP [8] as developed
in [8]. Veriﬁcation of SIP using Alloy involves the creation and
analysis of a protocol model in typed ﬁrst-order logic. The
novelty of our approach is in using a light-weight modelling
tool for the analysis of the model to determine its security
properties. We test the model, specify assertions about the
model, and explore its state-space using the model analyser
Alloy in order to assure ourselves that the protocol under
veriﬁcation has the desired properties. Our model intuitively
relates to the underlying multi-agent design framework of SIP.
First-order models of multi-agent systems have been analysed
in a different context using Alloy [16].
Using a lightweight formal method has the advantage of
having an elegant but powerful language with simple nota-
tion [14] giving a simple and robust meaning to the message
exchange using SIP. The Alloy tool-set allows us to have
a visual representation and analysis of the model developed
in [8].
II. SESSION INITIATION PROTOCOL
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [13] handles signaling
such as call setup, routing, and authentication to endpoints
within an IP domain [5].
A SIP network consists of a user agent who can create new
SIP requests (User Agent Client (UAC)) and can also respond
to SIP requests (User Agent Server (UAS)), that is, a user
agent is a logical entity that can act as both a UAC and a
UAS [13], [15].
The SIP Proxy server is used in forwarding SIP requests
received from UAs or other proxies to other locations (proxies,
UAs or external networks). It is also used to authenticate and
authorize users which are already registered their current lo-
cations with the SIP Registrar [5]. The base SIP speciﬁcations
deﬁnes six SIP requests which are also know as methods
and they are INVITE, ACK, OPTIONS, BYE, CANCEL and
REGISTER [13]. SIP is based on HTTP and it maintains a
standard format which is made up of the start line, header
ﬁelds and the message body [15].
Security ﬂaws of SIP have been identiﬁed [8]. Security
strategies for enhancing the overall security level have been
proposed [9] [4].
III. ALLOY
The lightweight model analyser Alloy [14] uses typed ﬁrst-
order logic. The speciﬁcations written in Aloy are declarative
and based on relations. The notation is concise and intuitive
and allows for formulation of a range of useful properties.
Alloy has been used for the modelling and analysis of
crucial design properties in various applications [16], [4], [3].
It provides a fully automatic analysis for checking properties
of the speciﬁcations.
The analysis performed by Alloy is within a limited
range and uses selected propositional satisﬁability (SAT)
solvers [14]. Given an Alloy formula and a scope, i.e., a bound
on the universe of discourse, the analyzer translates the Alloy
formula into a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form
(CNF), and solves it using an off-the-shelf SAT solver [14].
The Alloy tool-set has been used successfully to check designs
of various applications [6], [1], [11].
IV. SIP MODEL IN ALLOY
Consider, for example, the beginning of our Alloy speciﬁ-
cation of the SIP protocol.
module protocol/sip
sig SIPMessage{header: FirstLine,
body: SIPBody, status: SIPStatus}abstract sig SIPStatus{}
...
one sig Transmitted, Authenticated,
Timed extends SIPStatus{}
...
fun statusChange(): SIPStatus-> SIPStatus{
SIPStatus<: iden+ Transmitted->Authenticated+
Transmitted->Authenticated +
Authenticated-> Timed
}
The keyword module names a model. A sig declaration
introduces a set of (indivisible) atoms; the signatures SIPMes-
sage and SIPStatus respectively declare a set of atoms in-
dicating the components of the message and a set of atoms
identifying the status of the message. The ﬁelds of a signature
declare relations. The ﬁeld status in our speciﬁcation deﬁnes
a relationship of type SIPMessage × SIPStatus indicating that
the SIPMessage will have a speciﬁc status. The set of possible
states that the status of the message can be in is declared by
the signatures Transmitted, Authenticated, Timed which are
deﬁned to be subsets of SIPStatus. In our model, statusChange
is declared as a function updating the message status in a
sequence of steps.
A. The ﬁst-order model in Alloy
We deﬁne signature (objects), to model the SIP message
and the header of the message, which correspond to the unary
predicates 𝑆𝐼𝑃𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒(𝑥) and 𝑆𝐼𝑃𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟 in the ﬁrst-order
model.
abstract sig SIPHeader extends SIPMessage{
identifier: one FirstLine}
pred show(m: SIPMessage){
#m.header>=3}
The predicate emphshow expresses that any SIP message
requires existence of a ﬁrst line and at least three SIP headers.
The properties that a ﬁrst line should be a request or
response, and the consistency check that a request should not
be a response and vice versa are modelled easy in ﬁrst-order
logic.
sig FirstLine{
first: SIPHeader,
status: SIPStatus}
sig Act{}
sig Request extends Act
{request: lone Request}
sig Response extends Act
{response: lone Response}
abstract sig SIPHeader extends
SIPMessage{identifier: one FirstLine}
...
assert noSelfResponse{no m: Response| m=m.response}
assert noSelfSend{no n: Request| n=n.request}
We deﬁne the methods for authentication which are Invite,
Register, Options.
abstract sig Method{}
one sig Invite, Register, Options extends Method{}
sig Authenticate{
mode: Method}
Message authentication, which is SIP is identiﬁed by, for example,
using speciﬁc method can be deﬁned as follows:
sig messageAuth{authentication:
SIPBody-> one Authenticate}
one sig Mechanism1, Mechanism2
extends Authenticate{}
Using Alloy we can perform standard checks, such as no message
is a response to itself and no message was sent by itself
check noSelfResponse
check noSelfSend
Assertions in Alloy allow us to check constraints of our model.
For example, we assert that a message has its ﬁrst line in the header.
assert{some f: FirstLine,
m: SIPMessage| f in m.header}
We can vary the scope, forces different upper bounds of our model.
In the case below the upper bound is set to 3 nodes. The but keyword
speciﬁes a separate bound for a signature whose name follows the
keyword. Thus we restrict a generated example to 1 Transmission,
i.e. message exchange.
run show for 3 but 1 Transmission
Independent of each other attacks on SIP can be modelled in ﬁrst-
order logic [8]. For example, the Alloy speciﬁcation below models a
malformed SIP attack which is complement to SIP message.
module protocol/sip
open util/relation as rel
sig SIPMessage{header: FirstLine, body: SIPBody,
status: SIPStatus, action: Action}
abstract sig FirstLine{}
abstract sig SIPBody{}
abstract sig SIPStatus{}
abstract sig SIPAttack{ currentAttack: SIPAttack}
one sig Transmitted, Authenticated,
Timed extends SIPStatus{}
one sig Malformed, Signalling, Flood
extends SIPAttack{
malformed: Malformed,
signalling: Signalling,
flood: Flood}
abstract sig Action{}
one sig Transmit, Signal extends Action{}Fig. 1. Check NoSelfResponse
sig Time{}
assert noSignalling{all m: SIPAttack |
m in Malformed
}
check noSignalling
By using the signature Time we can model the existence of two
or more identical SIP messages within different time frames which
is occurrence of signalling attack, and the existence of any not
authenticated message which is also considered as a signalling attack.
B. A ﬁrst-order security model
The ﬁrst-order model of SIP as designed in [8] uses ﬁrst-order
logic to model properties of SIP. The SIP message structure is
formalised using unary and binary predicates, which deﬁne speciﬁc
properties based on SIP grammar speciﬁcations, the properties that
can be speciﬁed are, for example that any SIP message requires the
existence of a ﬁrst line and at least three SIP headers, a ﬁrst line
should be a request or response, whereas, a request should not be a
response and vice versa.
Examples of speciﬁcation of a SIP message properties, as deﬁned
in [8] in ﬁrst-order logic are:
SIPMessage(𝑥)( 1 )
∀𝑥SIPMessage(𝑥) ↔∃ 𝑓FirstLine(f)∧ (2)
∃
<=3ℎSIPheader(ℎ)( 3 )
∀𝑚Method(𝑚)={INVITE ∨ REGISTER ∨ OPTIONS} (4)
Fomula (1) speciﬁes a the SIP message as a unary protocol, formula
(2) states that all SIP message has a ﬁrst line, formula (3) that each
SIP message must have at least 3 headers; formula (4) deﬁnes the
methods as Invite, Register,o rOptions.
There is direct correspondence between these properties and our
speciﬁcation. We translate the model of [8] in typed ﬁrst-order logic
and automatically analyse and visualise it using Alloy. For example,
in Figure 1 we show an abstraction of the Alloy model of assertion
checking of NoSelfResponse. The model allows us to visualise the
model states where the status changes, on the ﬁgure indicated by ($
statusChange. Projections with respect to time, authentication method
or transmission are also possible.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we model the security properties of SIP and use Alloy
to analyse the model.
Modelling in Alloy is structural, logical, and intuitive. The spec-
iﬁcation language is based on typed ﬁrst-order logic and as such
expressive enough to allow us to capture complex behaviour and
specify and analyse interesting security properties.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Auguston. Software Architecture Built from Behavior Models ACM
SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, September 2009, Vol.34: 5, 2009
[2] Th. Bessis and V. Gurbani and A. Rana, Session Initiation Protocol
ﬁrewall for the IP Multimedia Subsystem core, Bell Labs Technical
Journal, Volume 15: 4, 2011
[3] B. Braga, J. Almeida, G. Guizzardi, A. Benevides. Transforming
OntoUML into Alloy: Towards Conceptual Model Validation using
a Lightweight Formal Method. Innovations in System and Software
Engineering (ISSE), Springer, 2010.
[4] M. Frappier, B. Fraikin, R. Chossart, R. Chane-Yack-Fa, M. Ouenzar.
Comparison of Model Checking Tools for Information Systems In
Proceedings of ICFEM, 2010.
[5] G. Camarillo. SIP demystiﬁed. McGraw-Hill, New York, 2002.
[6] J. Galeotti, N. Rosner, C. Pombo, M. Frias. Analysis of Invariants for
Efﬁcient Bounded Veriﬁcation. International Symposium on Software
Testing and Analysis, 2010.
[7] V. Cortellessa, V. Grassi. Reliability Modeling and Analysis of Service-
Oriented Architectures. Test and Analysis of Web Services, 2007.
[8] D. Geneiatakis and C. Lambrinoudakis and G. Kambourakis and
A. Kafkalas. A First Order Logic Security Veriﬁcation Model for SIP.
Proceedings of ICCI 2009.
[9] D. Geneiatakis, T. Dagiuklas, G. Kambourakis, C. Lambrinoudakis,
S. Gritzalis, K. Ehlert, D. Sisalem, Survey of security vulnerabilities
in session initiation protocol, IEEE , Vol.8:3, 2006.
[10] M. Feredj, F. Boulanger, A. Mbobi. A model of domain-polymorph
component for heterogeneous system design. In Journal of Systems and
Software, Volumen 82:1, 2009.
[11] W. Hassan, L. Logrippo. A Governance Requirements Extraction Model
for Legal Compliance Validation. IEEE International Requirements
Engineering Conference, 2009.
[12] L. Butty´ an and J. Hubaux. Security and Cooperation in Wireless
Networks: Thwarting Malicious and Selﬁsh Behavior in the Age of
Ubiquitous Computing, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[13] IETF RFC 3261: SIP: Session Initiation Protocol.
[14] D. Jackson. Software Abstractions: Logic, Language, and Analysis. MIT
Press, 2006.
[15] A. Oredope and A. Liotta. A Performance Based Evaluation of SIP Sig-
nalling across Converged Networks. Proceedings of the World Congress
on Engineering 2007 Vol II WCE, 2007.
[16] R. Podorozhny, S. Khurshid, D. Perry, and X. Zhang. Veriﬁcation of
Multi-agent Negotiations Using the Alloy Analyzer, In Proceedings of
IFM, 2007.
[17] Ch. Wolter, P. Miseldine, Ch. Meinel. Veriﬁcation of Business Process
Entailment Constraints Using SPIN. In Proceedings ESSOS, 2009.
Authenticated
Timed
FirstLine $statusChange
SIPBody
SIPHeader $statusChange Transmited
$statusChange
$statusChange
status
$statusChange
status